The externalisation of migration control in the European Union: first steps towards the external dimension of the space of freedom, security and
justice by Ryabov, Yuri A.
www.ssoar.info
The externalisation of migration control in the
European Union: first steps towards the external
dimension of the space of freedom, security and
justice
Ryabov, Yuri A.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ryabov, Y. A. (2012). The externalisation of migration control in the European Union: first steps towards
the external dimension of the space of freedom, security and justice. Baltic Region, 1, 44-51. https://
doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2012-1-5
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-328398
 44
 
 
 
The creation of an area of freedom, se-
curity and justice is one of the most rapidly 
developing aspects of European integration. 
It this paper, we take a look at the foreign 
policies involved in this process — aside 
from the internal development of the Euro-
pean Union, they concern a significant 
number of third countries, including Russia. 
In our view, the efforts to manage the flow 
of migrants and asylum seekers constitute a 
viable part of the external dimension within 
the AFSJ policies. Much of this article is 
based on the theoretical postulates intro-
duced by the scholars of the Paris School, a 
school within the discipline of security stud-
ies that conceptualized the connection be-
tween migration, terrorism, asylum, crime 
and ethnic clashes, and its role as a major 
threat facing the European Union. Exter-
nalization of this complex threat (that is, 
externalization in relation to the European 
Union) is thus seen as one of the key pre-
requisites to advancement of migration 
management activities beyond the EU (i. e. 
externalization of migration management). 
In this article, we analyze the role the EU 
plays at the international scene and catego-
rize the actions it took to manage the influx 
of migrants and asylum seekers from the 
1980s until the time when supranational 
administrative bodies were granted man-
dates in the spheres of Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) of the EU Member States. We 
conclude that it was as early as the 1990-s 
that the EU launched the policy which later 
allowed to transfer part of its security con-
cerns to third countries. 
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The external dimension of an area 
of freedom, security and justice (ED of 
AFSJ) is a distinct set of measures 
within the wider framework of EU for-
eign policy that has emerged in re-
sponse to a number of transnational 
threats. ED of AFSJ seeks to neutralize 
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those threats by trying to make non-member states adopt certain portions of 
acquis communautaire (EU legislation), especially in the sphere of Justice 
and Home affairs. 
ED of AFSJ was first introduced as a step to curb illegal migration. The 
latter is widely regarded as a threat for two reasons. Firstly, it has a negative 
influence on national identity — in some European countries the share of 
foreigners among the general population is already reaching quite significant 
numbers [1, p. 46]. Secondly, it is a central issue in the so-called ‘security 
continuum’ — a shared understanding of the complex of threats to the secu-
rity of the EU. The ‘security continuum’, for example, makes a clear con-
nection between illegal immigration, terrorism, asylum, crime rate and eth-
nic clashes. It also underlines the common, shared nature of these threats to 
the EU and their external character in relation to the Member States [2, 
p. 258—259]. 
It is the last postulate that has played the key role in adoption of a set of 
foreign policy measures aimed at managing the flow of immigrants and 
refugees. Traditionally, these measures are collectively referred to as ‘exter-
nalization’, or ‘remote control’ (police à distance), and involve two main 
strategies. First is shifting migration and (potential) refugee management 
from the external borders of the Member States to ‘undesirable’ people’s 
countries of origin. Second is involvement of third countries in EU migration 
management through making them responsible for readmission and proc-
essing asylum applications filed by the people who had illegally crossed the 
external borders of the EU via their territory [3, p. 334; 4, p. 22—37]. 
It is important to underline that externalization of migration management 
had started before supranational actors gained their JHA mandates (as intro-
duced by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997) and before ED of AFSJ provisions 
were formulated in Tampere (Finland) in October 1999. In fact, the whole 
process would not have been possible without the actions taken by the same 
legislative bodies that were involved in the development of the Schengen 
Agreement in the 1990s and without the proposals put forward by the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Immigration set up in October 1986 to create an ac-
tion plan for fighting “constant abuse of the right to seek political asylum” 
[5, p. 416]. 
For the most part, externalization measures are directly related to the 
Schengen Agreement that came into force on March 26, 1995. This docu-
ment, as we well know, introduces a number of requirements that foreign na-
tionals must meet in order to enter the area “without internal border control”. 
Among these requirements, is obtaining a single visa that gives one the right 
to freely move within the Schengen zone during the period of up to 90 days 
[6, p. 21—23]. 
Creation of harmonized visa policies of Schengen countries (a common 
list of third countries whose nationals require visa) became the key political 
instrument of control over illegal immigration.1 Bigo et al. provide statistics 
of how the numbers on the list grew over the years: in 1985 there were only 
70 third countries, in 1990, when the Agreement was signed, there were 110, 
                                                     
1 Before that, every Member State had its own list of such countries, which did not 
have to be coordinated with the rest of the EU. 
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and by 1995, when the Agreement finally came into force for the seven 
original Schengen states (Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal and France), the list already included 126 countries [2, 
p. 132; 7, p. 40]. 
What is obvious is that ‘harmonization’ really meant increasing, rather 
than decreasing, the number of countries on the list. The visa requirements 
spread to the citizens of North African states wishing to travel to Spain or 
Italy; the former also had to back out of the visa-free scheme with certain 
countries of Latin America (namely, the Dominican Republic, Columbia, 
Peru and Ecuador), and the latter cancelled a similar agreement with Yugo-
slavia. On the other hand, on the insistence of Germany, the nationals of 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were granted visa-free entrance, 
while Bulgaria and Romania were kept on the ‘black list’ [8, p. 57; 2, 
p. 132—133]. 
The scholars of the Paris School of security studies believe that a visa is 
something more than a sticker in one’s passport, a mere technicality ob-
structing the free movement of persons. According to them, visa is a cru-
cially important tool to keep ‘undesired persons’ in check, and the list of 
countries whose nationals require such visa is, in fact, a list of unannounced 
enemies that the European Union is trying to protect itself from [9, p. 85]. 
While undeniably important, the harmonized list of third courtiers is just 
the first step in managing the flow of migration. The second step tackles the 
problem at a more individual level. If we assume that the very presence of a 
country on the ‘black list’ is an open display of mistrust, then granting a visa 
to a national of such country signifies making ‘an exception from exception’ 
— the restoration of trust to this one person, who is singled out of the whole 
‘suspicious’ population of this nation. It is the diplomatic service and con-
sular offices of the EU Member States who must identify ‘undesired’ third 
country nationals and come up with legal grounds to deny them access (i. e. 
visa) to the territory of the Union. 
The role of the consular service has greatly increased with the introduction 
of the common visa and harmonization of some working procedures through 
the Common Consular Instructions. The migration control functions have been 
seriously reorganized. The main migration control point used to be the port of 
entry to a Schengen Member State, and the control itself was mostly per-
formed by the customs and border patrol officers. After the Schengen Agree-
ment came into force, the function of these agencies has been limited to 
document checking and identifying blatant cases of abuse of migration law, 
yet they no longer make admission decisions. In other words, the external bor-
ders of the EU rarely serve as admission points for the Schengen zone. It is es-
pecially true with regards to the nationals of blacklisted countries, because 
‘border control’ in its traditional sense still exists for the nationals of ‘white 
list’ countries [10, p. 6—8]. 
As the consulates and embassies are taking on the task of weeding out suspi-
cious visa applications, they actively refer to the data that is circulated and shared 
between the Member States. It can be information about ‘popular’ ways of ar-
ranging illegal migration in this or that country, lists of names of nationals with 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ visa histories, and, in some cases, even elaborated profiles of po-
tential ‘undesirable’ immigrants described in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, reli-
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gious affiliation, country of origin, place of residence, income level, and so on [11, 
p. 106—108]. 
The process of externalization of control over the flow of immigrants 
and (potential) asylum-seekers was completed when the Schengen Agree-
ment came into force. According to Article 26 of the Agreement, the carriers 
from the third countries (that are perceived to be the source of ‘non-qualified 
aliens’) become responsible for verifying that the carried travelers are in 
possession of the valid travel documents, which are required by the host 
Member State for entry into the Schengen territory at the air, land or sea 
border. 
Practice shows that quite a few governments overinterpret this provision. 
Thus, the domestic laws that have been introduced in compliance with the 
agreement, often task the carriers not only with verification of the presence 
of the necessary travel documents, but also with checking their validity — 
the carriers must now make sure the documents are not fake or expired, and 
that the data provided in them is correct. What we are seeing here is a gov-
ernmental function of migration control handed over to the carriers [12, 
p. 54—58]. The carriers (especially the airlines) had to adapt, too. The intro-
duction of the Schengen Convention increased their in-service training costs 
(since the staff had to be trained how to identify illegal aliens) and led to the 
rising number of fines the carriers had to pay if they failed to comply with 
the new provisions. Moreover, the carriers, at least in the beginning, were 
forced to work more closely with the EU authorities. Some airlines had no 
other choice but to hire former or even still serving customs and border con-
trol officers as experts who could help identify fake travel documents at 
check in points and while boarding the plane in some of the ‘hottest spots’ 
[12, p. 64—65]. 
The externalization of migration control also included tasking the third 
countries relevant to unauthorized migration to the EU with readmission. 
The Declaration on Principles of Governing External Aspects of Migration 
Policy adopted as a result of the EU Council meeting in Edinburgh in De-
cember 1992 established readmission as one of the principle instruments of 
managing illegal migration from countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The implementation of this instrument required harmonization of readmis-
sion agreements with the Member States. The Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Immigration came up with the ‘specimen bilateral readmission agreement’ 
that was approved by the EU Council in 1994. A year later, the same Coun-
cil approved a set of guiding principles to be followed in case of ‘standard’ 
and ‘simplified’ readmission (including the specimens of forms to be filled 
by relevant authorities, instructions on how to determine nationality and fact 
of illegal entry to the EU, etc.) [13, p. 20—24; 14, p. 25—33]. 
Furthermore, in 1996 the Council proposed a specimen readmission 
clause to be inserted in so-called “mixed agreements” (any agreement be-
tween the EU, or any of its Member States and a third country — associa-
tion, partnership, stabilization agreements, etc.). Unlike the documents 
adopted in the beginning of the 1990s, the new legislation put more respon-
sibility on the EU partners. Thus, the 1996 specimen included the so-called 
‘enabling clause’, or Article Y, which requested the third country to negoti-
ate, at a later stage, bilateral agreements with the Member States regarding 
International relations 
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non-nationals. In this case, the Member States could ask for and negotiate 
further obligations regarding non-nationals who passed through the con-
tracting party on the way to an EU Member State [15, p. 368; 16]. 
Apart from involving third countries in the readmission procedures, the 
EU externalized migration control by making third countries responsible for 
assessing asylum claims, and introducing the concept of ‘safe third country’ 
(pays tiers sûr). According to the new rule, an asylum claim will be rejected 
if the claimant has failed to seek asylum in the third (often — transit) coun-
try which is known to be granting asylums [17]. 
The EU formalized this rule in a number of documents of different judi-
cial force. The most important of those is the Dublin Convention of 1990, 
determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum 
lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities. Prepared 
by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration and signed 4 days prior to 
the Schengen Convention, the Dublin document introduces (in Article 3.5) 
the right of any Member State to send an applicant for asylum to a third 
State, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1951 
as amended by the New York Protocol of 1967 [18, p. 4]. Article 29.2 of the 
Schengen Convention contains a similar rule, although it postulates the need 
for more compliance with the international obligation of the contracting par-
ties. 
Then, in 1992, the EU Council, during the gathering of migration minis-
ters from the Member States, adopted the so-called London Resolutions. 
While non-binding judicially, the Resolutions had a very strong impact, 
since it provided with detailed procedures for application of the concept of 
host third country. The Resolutions also provided with a list of requirements 
and criteria for establishing the safety of a country as a host third country: 
1) in those third countries, the life or freedom of the asylum applicant 
must not be threatened; 
2) the asylum applicant must not be exposed to torture or inhuman or de-
grading treatment in the third country; 
3) it must be the case that the asylum applicant has failed to use the op-
portunity to seek protection from the host third country before approaching 
the Member State; 
4) the asylum applicant must be afforded effective protection in the host 
third country against refoulement [19]. It is interesting to note, that the crite-
ria lack such important elements as the presence of a stronger connection of 
an applicant with a host third country other than a simple transit through its 
territory. The Resolution also fails to address the issue of whether the host 
third country is ready to accept an asylum seeker — from this point of view, 
the safe third country principle can be viewed as a one-sided norm benefiting 
the EU. In practice, the second concern (i. e. readiness to accept asylum 
seekers) is usually solved through drawing up bilateral readmission agree-
ments, although exactly how they apply to asylum seekers is often not really 
spelled out [20, p. 79]. 
Another externalization instrument was the introduction of the ‘safe 
country of origin’ rule (pays d’origine sûr). A country would be determined 
‘safe’ if it didn’t prosecute its nationals on the grounds of race, religion, na-
tionality, social status or political affiliation. If the claimant’s country of ori-
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gin was deemed safe, they would be unconditionally rejected an asylum and 
returned home. 
This rule was also established by the London Resolutions of 1992. The 
first resolution concerned countries in which there was generally no serious 
risk of persecution. This document both introduced the definition of the ‘safe 
country of origin’ and the criteria of inclusion of a country to the ‘safe’ list. 
When determining the safety of the country of origin, Member States were to 
consider the following: 
1) previous numbers of refugees and recognition rates for asylum appli-
cants from the country in question who have come to the Member States in 
recent years; 
2) observance of human rights (formal obligations undertaken by a coun-
try in adhering to international human rights instruments and how in practice 
it meets those obligations; the readiness of a country to cooperate with hu-
man rights NGOs); 
3) development of democratic institutions (elections, political pluralism, 
freedom of expression and thought, and the availability of legal avenues of 
protection and redress); 
4) stability of the above-mentioned elements and the possibility of dra-
matic changes in the future [21]. 
The second London resolution allowed Member States to either reject 
asylum claims from the nationals of safe third countries as ‘unfounded’ or 
run them through simplified procedures [22]. In practice it often meant that 
the asylum seekers were refused the rights to free legal assistance and were 
denied the possibility to communicate with the NGOs that protect the rights 
of the refugees. In some cases simplified procedures translated into decisions 
made on the basis of document review only without interviewing the claim-
ant. If the authorized body declined an asylum claim, this would often be the 
final decision, without a chance to appeal [23]. 
To sum up, externalization of migration management has led to the shift 
in conceptual understanding of ‘the border’ for third countries nationals. 
They encounter full-scale border check well before they actually reach the 
physical external borders of the EU — while submitting their visa applica-
tion, during the check-in at the airport (and sometimes even during boarding 
the plane), and, finally, when they arrive to a Member State port of entry. 
Also, even if the rules regarding ‘safe third country’ and ‘safe country of 
origin’ are sometimes interpreted and acted upon differently in different 
Member States, a number of third countries found themselves involved in 
the process of migration control in the interests, on behalf of, and on the 
conditions specified by Brussels. 
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